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Abstract: The Equality Act 2010 was designed to simplify as well as unify British 
discrimination law. While there has been some significant unification, there are a 
number of areas where it has fallen short with regard to simplification, indeed it has 
introduced or cemented complexity and confusion. This article examines three such 
areas concerning two of the protected characteristics (pregnancy/maternity and 
gender reassignment) and one of the claims (victimisation) within the Equality Act 
2010.
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1. Introduction
The Equality Act 2010 had a long gestation period. It was designed primarily to simplify, and 
strengthen in places, the diverse discrimination law statute book that had emerged over the past 
40 years and was the product of independent and governmental reviews in 2000, 2003 and 20071 
during which time the statute book grew evermore complex. While the Equality Act 2010 has unified 
much of the legislation—and strengthened it in places—it has also introduced or cemented com-
plexity and confusion. It is over twice the length of the draft Bill sponsored by Lord Lester in 2003 
(Hepple, 2011, p. 6) and while it was subject to many hours of scrutiny and proposed amendments 
(Ibid., p. 5) it has nevertheless been criticised for having many unscrutinised provisions.2 This article 
will consider three areas where further consideration may have clarified the law, better meeting the 
aim of making convoluted discrimination law more accessible and easier to understand for the ordi-
nary user of the Act.3
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The Equality Act 2010 prohibits discrimination and harassment, related to specific characteristics, 
during certain activities. It also prohibits victimisation (unfavourable treatment because of, broadly-
speaking, something done related to a potential claim) and promotes equality through limited posi-
tive duties. The three areas considered in this article comprise two of the nine protected characteristics 
within the Act (gender reassignment and pregnancy/maternity) and the claim of victimisation.
2. The peculiar status of pregnancy/maternity
The Act, as it currently stands, starts with a clear list of protected characteristics in section 4 (the first 
three sections containing a weak socio-economic duty which has not been brought into force), sim-
ply declaring “The following characteristics are protected characteristics—age; disability; gender 
reassignment; marriage and civil partnership; pregnancy and maternity; race; religion or belief; sex; 
sexual orientation”. The various definitions and prohibitions then outlaw discrimination or harass-
ment relating to those characteristics or to a “relevant” subset of them. Thus harassment per se 
treats only seven of the protected characteristics as relevant (excluding pregnancy/maternity and 
marriage/civil partnership) but when applied, i.e. to the disposal or management of premises a fur-
ther three characteristics (age, religion or belief and sexual orientation) cease to be relevant pro-
tected characteristics.4 There are also certain characteristic-specific provisions relating to disability5, 
gender-reassignment6 and pregnancy/maternity.7
Pregnancy/Maternity is the one protected characteristic excluded from the list of relevant pro-
tected characteristics for indirect discrimination,8 one of two excluded from the list of relevant pro-
tected characteristics for harassment,9 and the only protected characteristic not further defined in 
sections 5–12 of the Act. The exclusion from indirect discrimination has been described by McColgan 
as an “oddity” although she noted that circumstances which may otherwise have given rise to a 
claim “may of course however also amount to indirect sex discrimination” (McColgan, 2010). Indeed, 
in Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police v Keohane Mr Justice Langstaff stated “if an allegation 
arises that there has been indirect discrimination in relation to pregnancy, it cannot be asserted as 
such. If it is discrimination at all it is sex discrimination, and must fit the criteria for such a claim”.10 
In that case, which concerned the removal of dogs from a police dog-handler during her pregnancy 
and subsequent non-return of them, the Employment Appeal Tribunal were able to find both direct 
pregnancy/maternity discrimination and potential indirect sex discrimination.11 However, it is clearly 
not an inevitability that a sex discrimination claim could provide redress and Newman has posited 
that it may not be easy, i.e. for a pregnant woman disciplined for taking too many toilet breaks to 
bring an indirect sex discrimination claim.12 The exclusion of pregnancy/maternity from the list of 
relevant protected characteristics was explained by the then Solicitor-General during committee 
scrutiny of the Bill:
any harassment that a woman is subjected to will be covered by the protection against 
harassment related to sex. The Government therefore considers that specific protection 
against harassment because of pregnancy or maternity is unnecessary and would add no 
value … [during consultation], the Government made clear that it would only legislate if 
there was evidence of a real problem. No such evidence was forthcoming in these cases. 
(House of Lords & House of Commons Human Rights Joint Committee, 2009)
Nonetheless, the Human Rights Joint Committee concluded that pregnancy/maternity (and mar-
riage and civil partnership) could and should have been included as relevant protected characteris-
tics so as to “eliminate confusing distinctions”, “ensure comprehensive protection” against forms of 
discrimination not revealed in the consultation but which may nonetheless exist and avoid claim-
ants having to take “a roundabout route” attempting to use other protected characteristics (House 
of Lords & House of Commons Human Rights Joint Committee, 2009, para 108). The singular lack of 
definition for pregnancy/maternity, in those sections which appear between the list of protected 
characteristics and the definitions of discrimination (which starts with direct discrimination in sec-
tion 13), is compensated for by the various definitions in the specific pregnancy/maternity provisions 
(sections 17 and 18). The existence of specific provisions, however, does not fully explain that 
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absence as gender-reassignment and disability both have specific provisions and yet also appear 
alongside the other protected characteristics (being defined in sections 6 and 7).
In the early years of anti-discrimination legislation, pregnancy or maternity was not covered as 
sex discrimination required a comparison with a man and as Mr Justice Bristow put it “[w]hen she is 
pregnant a woman is no longer just a woman… [s]he is a woman, as the Authorised Version of the 
Bible accurately puts it, with child, and there is no masculine equivalent”.13 This approach—and any 
attempt to compare a pregnant woman with a man on sick leave—was, a decade later, disavowed 
by the ECJ which held that as “only women can be refused employment on the ground of pregnancy 
… such a refusal therefore constitutes direct discrimination on the ground of sex”.14 Statutory provi-
sions were introduced via the Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive 2002/73/EC leading to sec-
tion 3A being inserted into the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 in 2005,15 so as to “improve clarity and 
transparency in relation to this area of the law” and “and avoid the risk of infraction proceedings” 
(Department for Trade Industry, 2005). This originally required the complainant to be treated less 
favourably compared to how she would have been treated had she not become pregnant (or taken 
a period of maternity leave). Following a judicial review, which held that section 3A “should be recast 
so as to eliminate the statutory requirement for a comparator who is not pregnant or who is not on 
maternity leave”,16 the wording was simply truncated to “a person discriminates against a woman 
if—(a) at a time in a protected period, and on the ground of the woman’s pregnancy, the person 
treats her less favourably” (and mutatis mutandis re maternity leave).17 The judicial review also 
made clear that the government did not intend “that section 1 should remain available in parallel, 
but that section 3A should be the only route by which a claim for discrimination by reference to 
pregnancy/maternity leave” should be made.18 A couple of years later, the Equality Act 2010 repli-
cated the provision in section 18 (for work cases) and section 17 (for non-work cases)19 but adopted 
the use of “unfavourably” to reduce the need for comparison. However, it also promoted pregnancy/
maternity to a protected characteristic but that status could be said to be something of a mirage.
Section 17 of the Equality Act 2010 provides that a person discriminates against a woman if that 
person treats her unfavourably because of a pregnancy of hers or she has given birth within the 
previous 26 weeks. The period is different under section 18, the work cases provision. There, the 
protected period begins when the pregnancy begins but ends either when her additional maternity 
leave ends (if she has the right to additional maternity leave—which, in general, employees do—and 
does not return to work sooner) or at the end of the period of 2 weeks beginning with the end of the 
pregnancy.20 A separate subsection provides protection should she be treated unfavourably because 
she is exercising or seeking to exercise, or has exercised or sought to exercise, the right to ordinary 
or additional maternity leave.21 Both sections hold that direct discrimination within section 13, so far 
as relating to sex discrimination, does not apply to treatment of a woman/anything done in relation 
to a woman in so far as it is for a reason within that section.22 This unambiguously prevents a parallel 
claim in both sex discrimination and under those sections (as was also stated to be the case under 
the old law as mentioned above). A claim in direct sex discrimination could, however, be brought 
outside the relevant period (in work cases if connected to that pregnancy or an illness suffered as a 
result of it and in non-work cases if connected to the fact of having given birth, including breast-
feeding beyond six months) but could not, in terms, be brought if the treatment was due to exercis-
ing the right to maternity leave.
However, section 13 contains no limitation with regard to protected characteristics unlike indirect 
discrimination which delists pregnancy/maternity. The explanatory notes—as with the actual word-
ing of the section—refer to protected characteristics in general and specifically reference the list in 
section 4.23 Furthermore, when explaining associative discrimination—that the direct discrimination 
provision can encompass unfavourable treatment because of the complainant’s association with 
someone who has the protected characteristic—the notes solely exclude marriage/civil partnership 
from such coverage.24 Given its status as a protected characteristic in section 4, its inclusion in the 
list of relevant protected characteristics for the public sector equality duty in section 149 (which 
again solely excludes marriage/civil partnership), the application of the positive action provisions 
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(sections 158 and 159) to all protected characteristics (with one of the examples in the explanatory 
notes alluding to maternity),25 and the clear lack of indication of exclusion as is freely made else-
where, pregnancy/maternity could be seen to be included within section 13. This is brought into 
doubt, however, by section 25 which explicitly set out what is meant by the nine discriminations (i.e. 
“Age discrimination is—(a) discrimination within section 13 because of age; (b) discrimination within 
section 19 where the relevant protected characteristic is age” and “Gender reassignment discrimi-
nation is—(a) discrimination within section 13 because of gender reassignment; (b) discrimination 
within section 16; (c) discrimination within section 19 where the relevant protected characteristic is 
gender reassignment”) and which for maternity/pregnancy solely refers to the special provisions in 
sections 17 and 18.
From the above it can be seen that, somewhere, something is missing (or erroneously included). 
Either the summarising section 25 has omitted pregnancy/maternity from the scope of section 13 or 
section 13 should have followed the example of section 19 in delisting the protected characteristic. 
Sections 17 and 18 (and their predecessors) were designed to clarify the extant law and so sex dis-
crimination—bar the attempt at clarification—could have covered the ground. In attempting to 
clarify the law, a time-based division has been introduced which serves only to confuse. Given the 
inherent overlap with sex, a declaratory provision including pregnancy/maternity within the defini-
tion of sex, and thereby removing it from the list of protected characteristics, is one way greater 
clarity could have been achieved. Alternatively, greater legislative scrutiny could have rendered it 
not only a protected characteristic but part of a cogent and consistent legislative scheme.
3. The characteristic of gender reassignment—Limited and indeterminate
The Equality Act 2010 broadly replicated previous law regarding gender reassignment although it 
has slightly extended its coverage (to cover activities such as the provision of services) and its defini-
tion. Originally, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 did not contain any provision for the protection of 
those who were in process of gender reassignment; the protection under the SDA was purely avail-
able to heterosexuals who were able to compare their treatment to someone of the opposite sex.26 
This was changed as a result of the ruling in the European Court of Justice which held that dismissal 
of an employee was contrary to the Equal Treatment Directive where “dismissal of a transsexual for 
a reason related to a gender reassignment must be regarded as contrary to Article 5(1) of the 
Directive [which concerned discrimination on the ground of sex].” 27 This decision latterly led to sec-
tion 2A being inserted into the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 which defined gender reassignment as 
“a process undertaken with medical supervision”. 28 It is this aspect of the definition that has been 
changed but arguably to an ambiguous and yet limited outcome. The requirement for medical 
supervision has been removed but the Act explicitly ignores non-binary gender among other things.
Transgender is an umbrella term which describes those who feel the need to present themselves 
in a gender other than the one they were assigned to at birth. Non-binary refers to any gender that 
is not exclusively male or female. A transvestite is someone who wears clothing of the opposite 
gender to the one to which they were assigned at birth but may nonetheless identify with their origi-
nal gender. A person who feels that they should live permanently—or variably—in the gender 
opposite to the one assigned at birth are transsexual. People who have intersex conditions are born 
without genitals which clearly identify that they are either male or female and decisions have to be 
made as to which sex should be attributed to them. Transsexuals will often (although not always 
and certainly not necessarily) take appropriate steps to change their body to reflect their inner gen-
der. It is the process of moving to one gender from another that is “gender reassignment”. The terms 
transgender and intersex are often confused by many people as they perceive these groups as wish-
ing to choose their own gender identity. Although it is true that some intersex individuals will go on 
to change their gender in later life and actually see themselves as transgender, the two groups are 
distinct. It is also true that those who have intersex conditions face different forms of discrimination 
from those who are transgender however only some countries, notably Australia, have publicly 
acknowledged that those with intersex conditions have different needs from those who identify as 
transsexual (Whittle, Turner, & Al-Alami, 2007).
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The Equality Act 2010 explicitly relates to gender reassignment and transsexualism. However, the 
underlying rationale for the coverage of transsexualism could be taken to apply more widely. Why in 
the words of the seminal case of P v S and Cornwall County Council would toleration of discrimination 
against those undergoing or have undergone a process of transition “be tantamount, as regards 
such a person, to a failure to respect the dignity and freedom to which he or she is entitled, and 
which the Court has a duty to safeguard”29, whereas such discrimination against those who do not 
wish to live permanently in a changed gender, or who merely wish to wear clothes related to another 
gender, would not? Why should the former be deemed to be “based, essentially if not exclusively, on 
the sex of the person concerned”30 any more than the latter? This apparently restrictive approach is 
in contrast to the removal of the requirement for medical supervision and undermines any proposi-
tion that the question of certainty is a reason for the distinction (as regards non-binary gender if not 
transvestism). The Code of Practice on Employment also states that there is no requirement for the 
individual to discuss with their employer their gender status.31 The removal of any reference for the 
need of medical intervention and the fact that the employee is not required to discuss his/her plans 
with his/her employer creates such a situation of uncertainty.
It has been suggested that there are two phases of being transsexual—primary and secondary. 
The main characteristic of primary transsexualism deals with “a lifelong of gender dysphoria—these 
are the feelings that a transsexual experiences because of the incongruity of his/her gender, a his-
tory of cross-gender identity, and an absence of fetishism associated with cross dressing” (Docter, 
1988). Docter goes on to explain that the main characteristic of secondary transsexualism deals 
with the “history of some sexual arousal to cross dressing, progressively stronger history of gender 
dysphoria which may be stress related, less ego integration than in transvestites…” (Ibid.). Secondary 
transsexuals are very different from primary transsexuals in one very different important aspect. 
Primary transsexuals have a lifelong history of intense gender dysphoria and secondary transsexu-
als should have an absence of this. Such a summary as this highlights the fact that there is often 
transition between transvestism and transsexulaism. Nangeroni (1997) categorises this as 
“transgenderism.” She states that “a transgender person is someone whose gender display at least 
sometimes runs contrary to what other people in the same culture would normally expect.” Obviously 
this is a very general definition and what is considered “the norm” will depend on the attitudes of 
society and to some extend the protection available to all of us. In effect, this definition could apply 
to females who dress in perceived male clothing (we used to call them tom boys). It could also relate 
to men whose dress could be seen as more feminine or more flamboyant. This brings us back to a 
key point: at what point does the Equality Act protect transgender?
It would appear that the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the Equality Act protect gender reassign-
ment and not non-reassigned transsexuals. The removal of the requirement for medical intervention 
obscures that line and arguably renders the distinction between being a transvestite (where no protec-
tion exists) and being a transgendered person artificial. However, as things currently stand, the ques-
tion “at which point does protection start”, is still answered—to an unsatisfactory extent—by reference 
to a pre-2010 case. 32 In Croft v Royal Mail, the Employment Appeal Tribunal considered that pre-oper-
ative male was a man and therefore there was no discrimination in preventing use of a female toilet. 
The Court of Appeal took a more subtle approach and held that gender reassignment protection cov-
ered all stages of the reassignment under medical supervision but that it was correct to prohibit use of 
the female toilet for a period of time during which Ms Croft could use the unisex (disabled) toilet. This 
pragmatic approach left open in what circumstances pre-operative male-to-female transsexuals may 
use female facilities with the Court of Appeal stating that employers should be flexible. With the re-
moval of the medical supervision requirement and with no clear guidance within the Equality Act the 
issue of at what point does protection begin is still left open to interpretation by employers.
Being a transvestite was not protected under the old law and when the Equality Act was intro-
duced it was not a surprise to find that protection was not there, nor that there was any protection 
for those who identify as non-binary gender. An individual who is a transvestite may only be pro-
tected under the Act if they can frame their claim by reference to one of the nine protected 
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characteristics. Although It may be seen that transvestites are one stage further removed unless 
their transvestism is related to transexuality or a protected characteristic, the interpretation of the 
decision in P & S v Cornwall Council does suggest that “dismissal of a transsexual for a reason related 
to a gender reassignment must be regarded as contrary to Article 5(1) of the Directive” may still offer 
the opportunity for a non-binary persons at least, if not transvestites, to argue that as at some point 
in the future he/she may opt for permanent gender reassignment, and thus fall within the protection 
of the Act.
4. Victimisation—An invalid variation
Victimisation, less favourable treatment because of something done in good faith (or something 
which the defendant thinks may have been, or may be, done) related to a potential claim, had been 
part of modern British discrimination law since its beginning, with i.e. section 4 of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 defining “discrimination by way of victimisation”. Similar provisions 
appeared in the Race Relations Act 1976 (s.2), Disability Discrimination Act 1995 (s.55) and the three 
Employment Equality Regulations covering religion or belief, sexual orientation and age.33 While the 
later extension of the coverage of religion or belief and sexual orientation to goods and services did 
not use the word “victimisation”, the concept was nonetheless included within sub-provisions of 
discrimination.34 The main, heralded change during the unification into the Equality Act 2010 was 
that section 27 dispenses with the old formulation that required “less favourable treatment”, prefer-
ring instead to subjecting to a detriment which it is said (together with both the removal of the word 
“discrimination” and its placing under a heading of “other prohibited contract”) renders it no longer 
a form of discrimination, as “there is no longer a need to compare treatment of an alleged victim 
with that of a person who has not made or supported a complaint under the Act”,35 but a separate 
claim. However, the subjecting to a detriment must still be “because of” something done (or per-
ceived to be done) in connection with the Act. An element of comparison could thus be said to re-
main—for how else can one determine whether a detriment is because of such a thing or because 
of an unrelated matter. An actual comparator is clearly not required but some form of hypothetical 
comparator arguably remains in the picture.
An apparently more significant change wrought by the Equality Act 2010 was that victimisation 
appeared to be removed from post-employment protection. Section 108 makes it unlawful to dis-
criminate against, or to harass, someone after a relationship covered by the Act has ended. This 
replicated provisions in the predecessor legislation but with two differences: it expanded the cover-
age to more fully cover non-employment relationships and it in terms excluded victimisation (sub-
section (7) holding “But conduct is not a contravention of this section in so far as it also amounts to 
victimisation of B”). The explanatory notes on the section state that “if the treatment which is being 
challenged constitutes victimisation, it will be dealt with under the victimisation provisions and not 
under this section” (353). The victimisation provision, however, no more explicitly covers post-rela-
tionship situations than the discrimination and harassment provisions. Failure to cover post-employ-
ment victimisation would breach European obligations,36 but that seemed to be the express 
intention—as set down in legislation—of Parliament. This led to a series of cases in which the EAT 
and Court of Appeal tussled with the provision.
In Rowstock v Jessemy, Mr Recorder Luba QC and two lay members, were “amply satisfied that the 
effect of the literal words of section 108(7) is to produce a lacuna in the statutory scheme of protec-
tion from discrimination, harassment and victimisation which the UK is required by EU legislation to 
enact”.37 While they were tempted to follow the approach of the Employment Judge in reading 
“employment” as including post-employment, to do so would both be an incomplete re-casting, as 
section 108 extends beyond employment relationships and it would leave, i.e. goods and services—
and even partnerships—unprotected and impermissibly cross the interpretive Rubicon in “flying di-
rectly in the face of what Parliament has actually enacted in section 108 (whether for ‘good’ reason 
or ‘bad’ reason or through error or inadvertence)”.38 A short while later, the EAT in Akwiwu & Anor v 
Onu39 noted the strength in arguing that as express mention was made of victimisation, but only so 
as to exclude it, in section 108, the draftsman must have had victimisation in mind and the limitation 
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could thus be seen to be deliberate.40 However, this troubling and not “easy to discern”41 provision, 
which neither party could satisfactorily explain, could, they thought, best be considered as excluding 
something from the operation of the section because another provision (within or without the 
Equality Act 2010) provided recompense (for otherwise there would be no need to restrict the claim 
if no claim existed).42 Accordingly, as a matter of domestic construction they rejected an interpreta-
tion which excluded claims for post-employment victimisation.
The Court of Appeal, when considering both cases, in the appeal of Rowstock, took yet a different ap-
proach.43 A later Court of Appeal judgment, Deer v University of Oxford, summarised the case as holding 
“that this [was] one of those exceptional cases where the court can confidently say that the draftsman 
has erred and has, by an oversight, failed to reflect Parliament’s clear intention, and is in a position to 
remedy that error.”44 However, the primary method was to rely on the requirement under European 
Union law to read national law so far as possible as complying with the European obligation45 and they 
found nothing to prevent such a reading in terms of implying in a subsection allowing post-employment 
victimisation claims. As for the meaning of subsection (7), Underhill LJ commented:
I am not sure that anything needs to be done about sub-section (7). In the unlikely event 
that anyone seeks to rely on it in future, some other court can cudgel its brains about what 
real effect, if any, it has: all that matters for present purposes is that it can have no meaning 
which is inconsistent with post-termination victimisation being unlawful.46
Whatever the approach, the result would be a judicial implication of a subsection allowing such 
claims. If a predominantly national approach was adopted (as in Akwiwu in the EAT), the disparate 
treatment of victimisation and discrimination/harassment would create a peculiar mishmash of 
post-employment claims being within the primary provision for the former but in a dedicated ancil-
lary provision for the latter. However one looks at it, the Act is in an unsatisfactory state regrading 
victimisation. It may now be clear that post-employment victimisation is covered by the Act; the 
tangible Act itself is far less clear.47
5. Conclusion
Despite its long gestation period, there were a number of clear errors in the Equality Act 2010 as 
originally passed, such as a reference in schedule 3, para 8(2) originally referring to “section 17 of the 
Education (Scotland) Act 1982” rather than 1980 or the wording of the compromise agreements 
provision appearing to exclude any lawyer or official who had previously advised the complainant 
from advising him/her on the compromise agreement and requiring a further person to provide ad-
vice with a likely increase in cost.48 The subjects of this article are less clear-cut but are further ex-
amples of either a lack of parliamentary scrutiny or of political will or both. The Equality Act 2010 has 
helped unify the law in the area but as things stand the existence of such enigmatic or merely inad-
equately transposed provisions are testament to a failure to make the law more accessible and 
easier to understand for the ordinary user of the Act.
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would be remitted to the employment tribunal.
12.  Newman (2010). With regard to the pregnancy/ma-
ternity specific provisions he says “Although ss.17 and 
18 go beyond the bare fact of pregnancy and cover 
pregnancy-related illness and maternity leave, they fall 
a long way short of preventing unfavourable treatment 
because of any reason arising out of pregnancy, such 
as a weaker bladder.”
13.  Turley v Allders Department Stores Ltd [1980] ICR 66, 
70.
14.  Dekker v Stichting Vormingscentrum Voor Jong Volwas-
senen (VJV-Centrum) Plus (Case 177/88) [1992] ICR 
325, [12].
15.  Via reg. 4 of the Employment Equality (Sex Discrimina-
tion) Regulations 2005, SI 2005/2467.
16.  R (Equal Opportunities Commission) v Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry [2007] ICR 1234, [63].
17.  Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Amendment) Regulations 
2008, SI 2008/656, regs .2(2) and 2(3).
18.  R (Equal Opportunities Commission) v Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry [2007] ICR 1234, [3].
19.  Protection was extended to cover public functions, 
education, and associations.
20.  S.18(6) Equality Act 2010.
21.  S.18(4) Equality Act 2010. Ordinary Maternity Leave 
(OML) and Additional Maternity Leave currently both 
last for 26 weeks. As OML may be taken up to 11 weeks 
before the due date the period post birth could run 
from 15 weeks to 52 weeks. However, as worded, the 
unfavourable treatment—as opposed to the leave—
need not take place in that period. S.18(3) covers 
compulsory maternity leave (2 weeks or 4 weeks if a 
factory worker).
22.  Ss. 17(6) and 18(7) Equality Act 2010.
23. Para 59.
24. Para 60.
25. Para 517.
26.  s1 Sex Discrimination Act 1975; and, in a discrete provi-
sion, to married persons in the employment field (s.3).
27.  P v S and Cornwall County Council Case C-13/94, [1996] 
IRLR 347.
28.  Via the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) 
Regulations 1999, SI 1999/1102.
29.  P v S and Cornwall County Council Case C-13/94, [1996] 
IRLR 347, [22].
30. Ibid. [21].
31. Statutory Code of Practice—Employment, EHRC para 2.27.
32. Croft v Royal Mail [2003] IRLR 592.
33.  Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 
2003, SI 2003/1660, Employment Equality (Sexual 
Orientation) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1661, Employ-
ment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1031.
34.  S.46(4) Equality Act 2006 and reg. 3(5) Equality Act 
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2007, SI 2007/1263.
35. Explanatory Notes to the Equality Act 2010, para 103.
36.  E.g. Equal Treatment Framework Directive (2000/78/
EC), the Race Directive (2000/43/EC) and Coote v 
Granada Hospitality Ltd (C-185/95) [1998] ECR I-5199.
37. [2013] IRLR 439, [29].
38. [2013] IRLR 439, [38].
39. [2013] ICR 1039.
40. [2013] ICR 1039, [71].
41. [2013] ICR 1039, [73], [75].
42. [2013] ICR 1039, [76].
43. Jessemey v Rowstock Ltd & Anor [2014] ICR 550.
44.  [2015] IRLR 481, [30]. Following the House of Lords’ 
criteria in Inco Europe v First Choice Distribution [2000] 
1 WLR 586 (it being legitimate to correct an inadver-
tent drafting failure if the court was both sure of the 
intended purpose and confident as to what was the 
intended substance of the provision that bar the error 
would have been enacted).
45.  The case summarily refers to this as the Ghaidan  
approach (at [38] et seq) but cites Pickstone v Free-
mans plc [1989] AC 66, Litster v Forth Dry Dock and 
Engineering Co Ltd [1990] 1 AC 546 and Vodafone 2 v 
Her Majesty's Commissioners of Revenue and Customs 
[2009] EWCA Civ 446 as well as Ghaidan v Godin-Men-
doza [2004] 2 AC 557.
46. Jessemey v Rowstock Ltd & Anor [2014] ICR 550, [49].
47.  Such lack of clarity or confusion was noted in Jes-
semey at [46]: “…This error [a rogue inclusion of s.108 
as defining discrimination in the Index of Defined 
Expressions in schedule 28] is not directly material to 
the problem before us, but it reinforces the impression 
that the draftsman may rather have lost his way in his 
treatment of section 108.”
48.  Which led to an amendment via the Equality Act 2010 
(Amendment) Order 2012/334 to make it clear that 
the existing advisers can continue to advise (by insert-
ing “to the complainant” after “independent adviser” 
and then inserting “(other than the complainant)” so 
that section 147(5)(a) reads “a person (other than 
the complainant) who is a party to the contract or the 
complaint”).
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